The Principle of Conditional Preservation in Belief Revision

Abstract

Although the crucial role of if-then-conditionals for the dynamics of knowledge has been known for several decades, they do not seem to fit well in the framework of classical belief revision theory. In particular, the propositional paradigm of minimal change guiding the AGM-postulates of belief revision proved to be inadequate for preserving conditional beliefs under revision. In this paper, we present a thorough axiomatization of a principle of conditional preservation in a very general framework, considering the revision of epistemic states by sets of conditionals. This axiomatization is based on a non-standard approach to conditionals, which focuses on their dynamic aspects, and uses the newly introduced notion of conditional valuation functions as representations of epistemic states. In this way, probabilistic revision as well as possibilistic revision and the revision of ranking functions can all be dealt with within one framework. Moreover, we show that our approach can also be applied in a merely qualitative environment, extending AGM-style revision to properly handling conditional beliefs.KeywordsEpistemic StateBelief RevisionBelief StatePossibility DistributionPropositional FormulaThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.