The principal-agent model in venture investment based on fairness preference

Abstract

<abstract> <p>The fairness preference in the principal-agent relationship is a vital factor that can even determine the success or failure of one program. Under normal circumstances, the capital invested by VC is often several times that of EN, which is one of the reasons for the profit gap between EN and VC. Therefore, when establishing a principal-agent model with fairness preferences, it is necessary to project the utility of VC to the level of EN and compare it with the utility of venture entrepreneurs, which will better reflect the profit gap between the two. On the basis of previous studies, this paper considers the amount of contribution of the participants, builds four principal-agent models to find the optimal distribution of income between the Venture Entrepreneur (EN) and the Venture Capital (VC) in a venture capital investment program, two without fairness preference and others with fairness preference. After the simulation we confirm that the fairness preference coefficient exerts a great impact on the distribution of income in both situations where information is symmetric and asymmetric, and a strong fairness preference will lead to a greater net profit gap between the EN and the VC. Thus, the EN should carefully choose the level of his efforts to realize the maximum return for him. In the case of information asymmetry, EN's optimal effort level decreases as the fairness preference coefficient increases.This will affect project revenue. And then affect the VC income.</p> </abstract>