The Primitive Relations of Knowledge by Acquaintance

Abstract

In this chapter, I focus on certain very fundamental issues related to any theory of whatever it is that allows us to become directly aware of something. In doing so, I start with what is perhaps the best realist analysis historically available to us, Russell’s theory of knowledge by acquaintance, though I include considerations from James’ theory as well. Given the prevalence of views which either deny that there is anything specifically “mental” about mental events, or deny that there are such things at all, there are a lot of good reasons to start with a realist who took their existence quite seriously. Russell’s intention to avoid fallacies of all kinds, including that of assuming as premises the very facts one intends to prove or disprove, renders his analysis very useful. He has provided us with a carefully thought out, albeit faulty classification of many of the most basic primitive relations of what he called “knowledge by acquaintance.” This was his concept of immediate awareness, though he did not clearly distinguish levels of awareness generally.