The Prevalence of External States’ Covert Interests over Overtly Emphasised International Conflict Resolution Agendas Throughout a Decade of Libyan Uncertainty

Abstract

This study offers a comparative perspective on four external states’ behavioural tendencies in contrast to their officially upheld ambitions witnessed throughout the past ten years in Libya. Sound promises on conflict resolution, mitigation and alleged alignment with R2P principles is of course nothing new in the international arena, nor is the fact that the parallel existence of selfish agendas constitute an “innovation”. Nevertheless, the case of failed reconciliation and stabilisation process of Libya despite seemingly massive international support offers a recent sphere for investigating the whole spectrum of underlying opposition among the external parties. What started out as a domestically rooted conflict, soon developed into an increasingly international one. After several attempts at the establishment of a truly unified government, interests have never got sufficiently close to each other. What this article sets out to expand on is a fundamentally balance of threats motivated geostrategic opposition, which was only seemingly centred around local key figures like Haftar, Sarraj or even influential tribal leaders. Numerous foreign stakeholders were acting against the very declarations and statements they themselves called their fellows to comply with via means of proxy actions and in hopes of capitalising on the advantages stemming from the status quo. This work discusses the means these states acted counter-productively against the Libyan conflict resolution.