The presumption of assurance

Paul Faulkner

doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03074-y

Abstract

According to the Assurance Theory of testimony, in telling an audience something, a speaker offers their assurance that what is told is true, which is something like their guarantee, or promise, of truth. However, speakers also tell lies and say things they do not have the authority to back up. So why does understanding tellings to be a form of assurance explain how tellings can provide a reason for belief? This paper argues that reasons come once it is recognised that tellings are trusted. And the logic by means of which trust gives reason to believe is quite general; it applies equally to belief that is based on evidence rather than assurance. Outlining this logic requires the introduction of the idea of epistemic presumptions, whose truth plays the role of ensuring a connection between believer, justification and truth.

Highlights

According to the Assurance Theory of testimony, in telling an audience something, a speaker offers their assurance that what is told is true, which is something like their guarantee, or promise, of truth (Moran 2005; Hinchman 2005a; Faulkner 2011; McMyler 2011)
The epistemological problem here is that assurances, like promises, can be empty
When we trust a speaker for the truth, we presume their telling is truthful and that they are in a position to tell what they do

Summary

Introduction

According to the Assurance Theory of testimony, in telling an audience something, a speaker offers their assurance that what is told is true, which is something like their guarantee, or promise, of truth (Moran 2005; Hinchman 2005a; Faulkner 2011; McMyler 2011). It is through recognizing this intention to assure that an audience gains a distinctively testimonial reason for belief. It is to argue that the kind of epistemic role presumptions play in an Assurance Theory, they play more generally. The fifth section returns to the Assurance Theory of testimony and concludes

The assurance theory of testimony

Trust as a reason for acceptance

The presumptions of trust

The presumptions of inductive knowledge

Conclusion: assurance and evidence