The President's Legislative Policy Agenda, 1789‐2002. By Jeffrey E.Cohen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 302 pp.

Abstract

The President's Legislative Policy Agenda, 1789-2002. By Jeffrey E. Cohen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 302 pp. In The Presidents Legislative Policy Agenda, Jeffrey Cohen illustrates how a strategic president considers the congressional context in determining his legislative pursuits. Cohen uses congressional anticipations theory to answer a central question: why do 'divided government' and 'modern' seem to allow themselves to be defeated so often in Congress? (p. 48). Cohen quite convincingly offers the answer. Presidents consider context in deciding the likelihood of legislative success/defeat, and they adjust the legislative agenda accordingly. This book has many contributions, and it is important to discuss each, in turn. First, Cohen incorporates two central concepts in the study of the presidency into the theoretical and empirical efforts of the book. He rightly argues that the effects of divided government and the modern presidency are often viewed as near truisms. However, Cohen uses his data to speak to and refine these settled questions. Second, Cohen develops an impressive data set that spans the first year of the Washington administration to the second year of the George W. Bush administration. Rarely does longitudinal work on the presidency offer such systematic data. Though Cohen notes, understandable reasons exist for the emphasis on modern presidents (p.36), his data allow us to examine historical aspects of the presidency in a rigorous way. Is such comprehensive data possible for every study of the executive branch? No. However, Cohen explains that when possible, such data can only strengthen our theoretical and empirical understanding of the executive branch. Next, the empirical effort in this book is admirable. It is meticulous in both the manner in which it analyzes multiple aspects of the legislative agenda as well as the modeling choices employed. Chapters 4 and 5 examine variation in the size of the agenda and the content of that agenda, clarifying our understanding of the nature and process of agenda-building. These chapters show that strategically withhold proposals from the agenda when context--particularly, divided government--makes enactment less likely. In a friendlier political environment, expand the agenda. Chapter 6 considers the moderation hypothesis, showing that under divided government moderate their legislative agenda in order to improve the chances of enactment. Finally, Chapter 7 examines outputs. How successful is the strategic president in inducing enactment of his legislative proposals? …