Abstract

In today's White House, implementing elaborate lobbying campaigns in support of the president's legislative initiatives is a familiar exercise. However, even as tales of presidential arm-twisting and deal making abound, still unclear are the general strategies by which presidents can build winning coalitions on Capitol Hill. Here I propose that presidents have available two basic options for influencing Congress: they can shift the distribution of preferences for roll-call votes, and they can censor the policy alternatives that make it that far. The first constitutes a vote-centered strategy, the second an agenda-centered strategy. After developing each within a framework that explains presidents’ choices of lobbying targets and tactics, hypotheses are tested against corresponding data on the interactions between administration officials and U.S. Senators for three important issues in the 107th Congress.

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