Abstract
Do the president s legislative proposals embody the president's sincere preferences or strategic modifications intended to improve the chances of obtaining a particular outcome? Students of presidential agenda-setting typically assume a sincere preferences approach, while students of congressional agenda-setting have long accepted the possibility of strategic behavior. This essay first reviews this debate and presents arguments supporting a “strategic” agenda-setter position. It then considers the methods by which administrations estimate the likelihood of passing legislation in Congress. I posit that estimations of the political feasibility of a bill conform to a Bayesian updating model of strategic agenda-setting choice. The essay then presents propositions about the conditions in which administrations are likely to act sincerely or strategically. Whether presidential administrations pursue the president s sincere preferences or modify/ their proposals to improve the odds of passing a bill are the result of calculated decisions that seek to maximize the president's outcome.
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