The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952-1961. By Irwin F. Gellman. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015. 791 pp.

Abstract

The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952-1961. By Irwin F. Gellman. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015. 791 pp. This volume adds to the scholarly work presenting laudatory assessments of the and leadership style of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Irwin F. Gellman's mission is not to produce a comprehensive account of Eisenhower's but to present more accurately the relationship between Eisenhower and his vice president, Richard M. Nixon (p. xii), a relationship that has been misrepresented or ignored (p. 566). Gellman believes that Nixon is treated as inconsequential vice president (p. x), an inaccurate portrayal that he contends interferes with understanding Eisenhower's presidency. Eisenhower's leadership style revolved around the team concept (p. 6) but with a clear hierarchical design that cast Eisenhower as the decision maker on significant topics and subordinates, such as Nixon, as important advisors and implementers (pp. 6-7). Because Eisenhower was deeply troubled by the circumstances of Harry S. Truman's succession to the after his exclusion from critical national security issues, Eisenhower kept Nixon thoroughly informed (p. 566); included Nixon in meetings; and gave him diplomatic, domestic, and political assignments. Nixon evolved into one of Ike's most valuable subordinates (p. x). Gellman claims that Eisenhower fundamentally changed the role of the vice presidency (p. 566). Gellman presents extensive information regarding Eisenhower's presidency, the Eisenhower--Nixon relationship, and Nixon's vice presidency, based on his impressive archival research. Yet some important claims would benefit from restatement or qualification. Contrary to Gellman's suggestion, prior scholarship has recognized Nixon's vice as important. As Gellman states, Eisenhower included Nixon in meetings of the Cabinet, the National Security Council, and legislative leaders and gave him the assignments described in the book. Although frequent, regularly, and often are relative, and potentially ambiguous, modifiers, the repeated use of them (pp. x, 87, 307, 363, and 567) regarding Nixon's private meetings or meals with Eisenhower may create inflated perceptions of Nixon's centrality. Nixon's private meetings with Eisenhower occurred on average only every few weeks, as Gellman states (p. 87), and were not unique. Long intervals sometimes passed without such sessions, and Nixon was not included in many significant meetings. Gellman vigorously contests the popular view that Eisenhower wanted to replace Nixon on the 1956 ticket. He refers to Eisenhower's nonexistent effort to dump Nixon from the 1956 Republican ticket (p. 566) and seems to believe that Eisenhower thought Nixon could best advance his political future by moving to the Cabinet during a second term. Of course, Eisenhower did not demand that Nixon leave the vice presidency (p. …