Abstract
This study sets two goals which are represented by the answers to the following two basic questions. What are the possibilities of national policy-makers in terms of the efficient correction of negative externalities? Since available externality correction systems give suboptimal ex post results, which system is preferable, and under what conditions? The possibilities of the policy-maker to ensure the social optimum are determined by ‘enlightenment’ (‘knowledge’) and ‘commitment’ to social goals. When the actual (ex post) marginal private costs for emission reduction are higher than the planned (ex ante) marginal private costs for emission reduction, and when the marginal social benefit is elastic, the Cap-and-Trade system is more undesirable than the price system. When the actual (ex post) marginal private costs for emission reduction are greater than the planned (ex ante) marginal private costs for emission reduction, and when the marginal social benefit is inelastic, the price system is more undesirable than Cap-and-Trade system.
Published Version (Free)
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.