Abstract
In this article, I identify three explanations for postwar instability and the failure of peace settlements and test hypotheses derived from each perspective. The first explanation identifies the failure to resolve the issues in dispute as a key source of instability. The second explanation highlights the well-known problem of enforcement that often plagues agreements in an anarchic environment. The final argument considers the belligerents' incentives to renegotiate the terms of the settlement. Using a hazard model, I test hypotheses derived from each explanation with data on the duration of peace between dyads formerly at war between 1816 and 1992. I find little support for the resolution argument, only mixed support for the enforcement argument, and much more consistent support for the renegotiation argument.
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