The pre-reflective experience of "I" as a continuously existing being: the role of temporal functional binding.

Abstract

The present moment is of infinitesimally brief duration. In the brain, however, there are perceptual processes that bind together events occurring at different times, on a time scale of milliseconds, into a coherent and integrated temporal representation. These processes include temporal integration, as in perception of biological motion, synchronisation, and change detection. These processes are also responsible for temporal integration and coherence in inner mental life, such as in mental imagery. I argue that this gives rise to the pre-reflective experience of the self as a continuously existing being. Temporal integration is also a feature of the experience of action-outcome relations, and I argue that this produces a pre-reflective experience of the self, not just as continuously existing, but also as the doer of both physical and mental actions. This is the foundation on which the idea of the self as continuously existing on longer time scales--the narrative self--is built.