The Pragmatics of Operationism

Abstract

Experimental psychologists in the 1930s erred badly in interpreting Bridgman (1927/1960) to mean that a theoretical construct was scientifically valid given a single set of operations. This mistake was corrected in the 1950s with the adoption of a multiple or convergent operationism, which stimulated the development of cognitive psychology and remains widely used to this day. The major criticisms made by Bickhard, Green, Leahey and Rogers (all 2001) attempt to rebut my (Grace, 2001) supposed claim that converging operationism solved the philosophical difficulties inherent in operationism as a thoroughgoing account of scientific meaning. But I made no such claim. Instead, I argue that it is legitimate to assess operationism pragmatically, in a research context. On this view, reasons for the tenacity of operationism in psychology are clear: the use of operational definitions facilitates clarity of communication and helps scientists to formulate empirical tests of theories.