The Practice of Meaning in Nietzsche and Wittgenstein

Abstract

It has not often been noticed that Nietzsche and the later Wittgenstein, who are usually regarded as very dissimilar philosophers, approach the topic of meaning in a very similar way. The similarity occurs because both philoso phers attempt to show that meaning is a practical affair. Presumably it is this approach that has led to both names being cited as examples of what has been called postanalytical philosophy. For if we take it that meaning is not a the oretical entity we will also begin to wonder whether the tools of theoretical enquiry are suitable ways to access meaning. However, one can easily see why an analytic philosopher would be reluctant to accept such considera tions. For it is by no means obvious that theory is not coextensive with prac tice. After all, why cannot the procedures of science be used to explain our behavior? Biology and psychology approach behavior using the tools of analy sis; and if we wish to explore the claim that human practice differs from the animal, then surely our best approach is still that of analysis. While moral philosophy resists any crude behaviorism, it does not do it by appealing to considerations that lie beyond theoretical comprehension; it offers analyses of the mechanisms of reason. Without a doubt, the principal problem that analytic philosophy has in registering the challenge to its methodology offered by the works of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein is in accepting the far-from-obvi ous claim that theory and practice are not coextensive. The claim has a decid edly metaphysical feel to it. It seems that we are asked to accept that there is a foundation, albeit a practical one, beyond what can be grasped and under stood. According to analytic philosophy, the problem with any such claim is that, if we should analyze them, we would find that they are without mean ing. Here we meet what is probably the defining characteristic of analytic philosophy: it refuses to accept meaninglessness. And indeed, initially, one cannot help but have some sympathy for such an approach, for how can mean inglessness be accepted? The puzzle that such reflections leave us with, how