Abstract
The United States Supreme Court's connection to the ideal of the rule of law is often taken to be the principal basis of the Court's political legitimacy.1 In the Supreme Court's practices, however, the ideal of the rule of law and the Court's political legitimacy do not always coincide. This Note argues that the ideal of the rule of law and the Court's legitimacy part company with respect to the Court's practice of dissent. Specifically, this Note aims to demonstrate that the practice of dissent?the tradition of Justices publishing their differences with the judgment or the reasoning of their peers2?cannot be justified on the basis of an appeal to the ideal of the rule of law, but that other bases ofthe Court's political legitimacy provide a justification for this practice. The Note thus has two aspirations. First, it seeks to provide a justification for the practice of dissent in the Supreme Court. Second, in pursuit of that
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