The Practical Logic of Judicial Decision Making

Abstract

Russian judges operate under high pressure resulting from structural limitations imposed by internal bureaucracy of the judicial system, combined with institutionalized interdependence with procuracy and law enforcement agencies, where the former have upper hand over the judiciary. In the absence of transparency and mechanisms for public or professional accountability, judges engage into opportunistic behavior seeking satisfactory performance indicators, avoiding conflicts with law enforcement bodies, and economizing their own effort and time. This results in an accusatorial bias in Russian courts: they acquit not more than 1 out of 500 defendants. Within these structural limitations, though, the judges look for the opportunities to exercise some degree of judicial discretion to avoid unnecessary harm to the defendants who might be prosecuted unfairly, or investigated negligently. Where possible, they use termination of the cases on grounds of active repentance or reconciliation with the victim, and suspended sentences (probation) as substitutes for acquittals.