Abstract
This article discusses the way Matthew Boyle conceives of "reflection", a notion situated at the very heart of his philosophical project. After surveying how Boyle defines the notion and its function through the conceptual articulation of certain aspects "implicit" in our mental states, I highlight some issues that emerge from this approach. These issues stem from how Boyle thinks about the relationship of reflexive dependence between the domain of implicitness and its conceptual articulation provided through reflection. For Boyle, reflection “simply” abstracts certain features of the modes of presentation, which are always implicitly given. This, however, generates what I call the “myth of the given motion of presentation,” which I try to illustrate and problematize.
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