The Power to Resist: Mobilization and the Logic of Terrorist Attacks in Civil War

Sara M T Polo,Belén González

doi:10.1177/0010414020912264

Abstract

Existing research has argued that terrorism is common in civil war because it is “effective.” Surprisingly, however, only some groups use terrorism during civil wars, while many refrain altogether. We also see considerable variation in the use of terrorism over time. This article presents a theory of terrorism as a mobilization strategy in civil war, taking into account benefits, costs, and temporal dynamics. We argue that the choice and the timing of terrorism arise from the interaction between conditions for effective mobilization and battlefield dynamics. Terrorism can mobilize support when it provokes indiscriminate government repression or when it radicalizes rebels’ constituency by antagonizing specific societal groups. The timing of attacks, however, is influenced by battlefield losses, which increase rebels’ need to rally civilian support. The analyses of new disaggregated data on rebels’ terrorist attacks during conflicts (1989–2009) and of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) tactics in Iraq and Syria support our theoretical argument.

Highlights

In 2017, 10 organizations alone were responsible for 4,282 terrorist attacks, amounting to approximately 40% of all attacks and 68% of all terrorist fatalities in that year (17,915 victims).1 Nine of these organizations have been involved in civil wars, which have become the main source of global terrorism (Findley & Young, 2012)
Do some rebel groups resort to terror tactics, while others refrain from doing so? And what explains the timing of terrorist attacks in civil war?
We have argued that terrorism is used as a mobilization strategy in civil war under specific political conditions

Summary

Introduction

In 2017, 10 organizations alone were responsible for 4,282 terrorist attacks, amounting to approximately 40% of all attacks and 68% of all terrorist fatalities in that year (17,915 victims).1 Nine of these organizations have been involved in civil wars, which have become the main source of global terrorism (Findley & Young, 2012). By focusing on terrorism as an instrument of mobilization, and by identifying specific conditions under which terrorism is both effective and necessary for generating civilian support, we systematically account for variation in the use of terrorism across conflicts, rebel groups, and time. We address temporal variation in the use of terrorism by identifying when mechanisms of provocation and boundary activations are triggered during conflict, given that rebel groups can rely on alternative strategies of mobilization (e.g., Mampilly, 2011).

Results

Conclusion