Abstract
Does the internal power structure of revolutionary organizations influence the process of political transition? We extend Acemoglu and Robinson’s democratization model by considering the collective action problem and the heterogeneity of the revolutionaries. The collective action problem of the revolutionaries is modeled using a global game. We find that overconcentration of power in revolutionary organizations makes the transition to democracy more difficult. Because under overconcentration of power, even democratization is not enough to prevent revolutions, and a revolution is more likely to lead to a new authoritarian system. We offer a comparative case study by comparing China and Europe. The more centralized revolutionary process in China explains why democratization has not happened in China.
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