Abstract
This Article presents a unifying theory to explain judicial behavior in China. It argues that the configuration of the de jure and de facto power of the disputants and the court determines many of the actions of a Chinese judicial decision maker at the three stages of litigation: case filing, adjudication, and enforcement of court decisions. The theory offers a novel analytical tool to explain and predict, albeit in a highly stylized way, when Chinese courts follow the law, how they exercise discretion and what methods they prefer in handling lawsuits, as well as the functions the courts serve in the process. The theory contributes to the understanding of ongoing Chinese legal reforms and to the debate about judicial behavior in China as well as other countries without robust rule of law.
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