The Postulate of Precision: its Sense and its Limits

Abstract

The postulate of precision is generally considered to be an essential element of philosophical rationalism — in any of the forms it has taken in the history of Western philosophy. It is characteristic, in particular, of that kind of rationalistic philosophy which was proclaimed and practiced by the Lvov-Warsaw School. According to its representatives, precision and sufficient justification are two conditions which any rationally accepted statement must satisfy. The postulate of precision so conceived raises a number of questions. One of them concerns the rationale of the postulate. Why should we require precision of our statements? What reasons may be given for such a requirement? A common opinion maintains that the postulate of precision does not need any justification, since it is self-evident. Its validity becomes obvious if it is couched in suitable terminology. Precision may be identified with clarity, imprecision with obscurity, and these are words with a non-neutral, value-laden meaning. What is clear is good, what is obscure is bad. It seems evident then that we should aim at clarity and avoid obscurity. Such an approach, however, begs the question. It simply assumes that precision is something valuable rather than providing any reasons.