The postulate of adequacy: Phenomenological sociology and the paradox of science and sociality

Abstract

Alfred Schutz's postulate of adequacy has become a focal point of discussions of phenomenological sociology. For its proponents (e.g., Filmer et al., 1972; Zijderveld, 1972; Winter, 1966), the postulate of adequacy represents a radical, perhaps revolutionary, methodological requirement that distinguishes the phenomenological approach from positivistic theoretical orientations and entails a reconceptualization of the very idea of social science. Critics of Schutz's phenomenological framework view this postulate as inadequately formulated, inconsistent with Schutz's general theoretical position, and irrelevant or harmful to what they take to be the central concerns of sociological theory. The following analysis is an attempt to clarify and interpret the nature and implications ofthe postulate of adequacy. While the analysis is inspired and guided by Schutz's theoretical framework, it clearly goes beyond the context and presuppositions in terms of which his postulate is formulated, and the claims made here are based more on critical interpretation than on exposition.2 This analysis argues that, despite certain