Abstract
ABSTRACT In this paper I argue that a prominent account of doxastic responsibility, Epistemic Reasons-Responsiveness can be amended to avoid two problems with its treatment of delusions. I do so by appealing to Carolina Flores’ recent work on the evidence-responsiveness of delusions: by excluding what Flores calls masking factors from the mechanism of reasons-responsiveness, we are able to accommodate the possibility for individuals with delusions to be responsible for their belief. I conclude by motivating that this possibility is one we should care about.
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