Abstract
The positive prekernel, a solution of cooperative transferable utility games, is introduced. We show that this solution inherits many properties of the prekernel and of the core, which are both sub-solutions. It coincides with its individually rational variant, the positive kernel, when applied to any zero-monotonic game. The positive (pre)kernel is a sub-solution of the reactive (pre)bargaining set. We prove that the positive prekernel on the set of games with players belonging to a universe of at least three possible members can be axiomatized by non-emptiness, anonymity, reasonableness, the weak reduced game property, the converse reduced game property, and a weak version of unanimity for two-person games.
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