Abstract

The authors examine the evolution of Russia's position regarding the “Bulldozer Revolution” in Serbia in 2000. The response of official Moscow to the 'colour revolutions' at the beginning of the twenty-first century is a blank spot in Russian scholarly discourse, and the issue is being analysed in Russian and international historiography for the first time. In the course of the study, the documents of the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, the Digital Library of B. Clinton (USA), the Federal Election Commission of Yugoslavia, statements by major Russian politicians and diplomats, materials from leading domestic and Western media, many of which are published for the first time in the academic literature. The authors come to the conclusion that the official reaction of the leadership of the Russian Federation to the crisis events of autumn 2000 in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was cautious and restrained, which excluded open support for one of the parties to the internal political confrontation. While the collective West openly advocated the removal of Slobodan Milošević from power, Russia sought to ensure that the president of the country was elected by the Yugoslav people legally, without foreign interference and internal unrest. That is why, during the elections and before the victory of the “Bulldozer Revolution”, Russian officials and diplomats did not speak out in favour of any candidate, but also did not succumb to the pressure of Western politicians who sought to use Moscow to put pressure on Milošević. Russia attempted to play the role of mediator between the authorities and the opposition, yet in the face of proactive action by Western countries to overthrow the ruling regime, this policy was doomed to failure.

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