Abstract

Nigeria's once thriving plantation economy has suffered under decades of state neglect and political and civil turmoil. Since Nigeria's return to civilian rule in 1999, in a bid to modernize its ailing agricultural economy, most of its defunct plantations were privatized and large new areas of land were allocated to ‘high-capacity’ agricultural investors. This paper explores the local tensions associated with this policy shift in Cross River State, which, due to its favorable agro-ecological conditions and investment climate, has become one of Nigeria's premier agricultural investment destinations. It shows how the state's increasing reliance on the private sector as an impetus for rural transformation is, paradoxically, crowding out smallholder production systems and creating new avenues for rent capture by political and customary elites. Moreover, as Nigeria's most biodiverse and forested state, the rapid expansion of the agricultural frontier into forest buffer zones is threatening to undermine many of the state's conservation initiatives and valuable common pool resources. The paper goes on to explain why and how private sector interests in Cross River State are increasingly being prioritized over natural resource protection, indigenous rights over the commons, and smallholder production systems.

Highlights

  • The Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN, 1986) is the penultimate ‘paradox of plenty’

  • Privatization process When Nigeria returned to Civilian Rule in 1999, the federal government was already in the process of privatizing many of its assets

  • This marked an important shift from the military command economy to more coherent economic planning and public finance management

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Summary

Introduction

The Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN, 1986) is the penultimate ‘paradox of plenty’. With more than three-quarters of government revenues derived from hydrocarbons (IMF, 2013), Nigeria’s rentier state has long been notorious for oil politics and patrimonial accumulation (Schatz, 1984; Ikpe, 2000; Omeje, 2005). This has given rise to entrenched ethno-regional commercial and bureaucratic classes that serve primarily to articulate and advance the interests of international capital at the expense of domestic productive investment (Vaughan, 1995; Omeje, 2005). Where Nigeria was once a major exporter of cash

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