Abstract
This article outlines an approach to state building that focuses on the relationship between states and regimes. Our basic argument is that patterns of state formation and the emergence of strong or weak states are determined by three kinds of structural constraints: (1) the nature of the security threats faced by regimes; (2) the state's sources of revenue; and (3) the social basis of the ruling regime. The key mechanism that mediates between such structural constraints and outcome in terms of state formation is the relationship between state building and the interests of regimes and their constituencies. The nature of the constraints faced by regimes, and the strategies chosen by regimes and other actors to adapt to these constraints, determine the pattern of state formation.
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