Abstract

The recent conflict between Britain and Argentina transformed the South Atlantic into an area of major international concern. It also underlined the extent to which the region had been generally neglected by both policymakers and academics. It is true that since the early 1970s interest in the region had been growing for a variety of reasons: anxiety in Washington over increased Soviet naval capabilities; continuing political instability and uncertainty in southern Africa; increased awareness of the importance of undersea resources; concern over the future status of Antarctica. Despite these factors, the literature on the region remains uneven. There is a large literature dealing with the strategic importance of the Cape route and an even larger one dealing with the growth of Soviet naval capabilities. Yet relatively little attention has been paid to the task of relating Western concern for South Atlantic security to the interests and perceptions of the major Latin American states, particularly Argentina and Brazil.1 This paper will examine these interests and perceptions and will try and present a broad overview of the major elements in the South Atlantic jigsaw puzzle. It will focus on the various proposals that have been made for the formation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization. For the purposes of this discussion, the South Atlantic can be defined as that part of the Atlantic ocean south of the Tropic of Cancer, the southern limit of NATO. In talking about a South Atlantic Treaty Organization I will refer to all moves aimed at developing a more tightly-knit multilateral system of South Atlantic defence along NATO lines-moves that have at various times involved the United States, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, South Africa and Uruguay. In one important sense, however, the focus on 'SATO' is misleading: as I will argue, the divergence of views amongst the supposed members of a South Atlantic pact has been so great that its formation was always highly improbable. Nevertheless, the subject is worth examining in more detail for three reasons. First, because despite being pronounced dead on so many occasions, the idea of a South Atlantic pact has simply refused to die. It appears to have an intuitive logic that many a strategist finds unchallengeable. Secondly, because recent differences between the United States and its Latin American neighbours over the South Atlantic are indicative of wider problems in US-Latin American relations, indeed perhaps in American policy towards the Third World as a whole. Thirdly, because now that the Falklands conflict is over and attention is being focussed on the problem of constructing a durable settlement in the region, it is important to have a clearer understanding of exactly how attitudes and policies towards the South Atlantic have

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