The Politics of Regulatory Redistribution Revisited

Abstract

Redistribution- whether in the classical sense of who gets what at whose expenses, or in the contemporary sense of how interest group gains capture from trade- undeniably forms part of economic regulation. But how does economic regulation redistribute wealth in one form or the other from one group to others? Does economic regulation usually favor a group of superior ability to manipulate the political process? If does, under which conditions? This article investigates the nature of regulatory redistribution by assessing the conditional impact of economic, political, and institutional factors in American states regulatory policymaking, We find there is the likely behavioral difference between regimes of direct election and political appointment regarding regulatory bureaucracy-popular election of regulators is more likely to lead more consumer-oriented regulatory policies because elected regulators are relatively more responsible for their core constituents, voters. This implicitly suggests our argument that how regulatory bureaucracy behaves over redistribution matter is conditional upon the way regulatory bureaucracy is positioned in the structure of bureaucratic politics. their core constituents, voters. This implicitly suggests our argument that how regulatory bureaucracy behaves over redistribution matter is conditional upon the way regulatory bureaucracy is positioned in the structure of bureaucratic politics.