Abstract

ABSTRACTThe paper discusses the political dynamics underlying the agrarian dimensions of the peace agreement between the government and the Colombian main guerrilla (FARC). Such agreements were both sensible and progressive, but seriously limited in their distributional aspirations under the assumption that acautious approach would allay the fears of economic elites and prevent apolitical backlash. Experience has shown that the assumption was wrong. The link between pro-peace coalitions and agrarian reformismwas weak. Furthermore, implementation is not delivering, and has been riddled with violence, instability, disorder and passionate contestation. Ishow that post-agreement moderate paths not necessarily prevent polarisation and that instead, they can incur in significant (and asymmetrically distributed) costs. Isuggest that coalition formation-breakdown and specific state capacities provide key mechanisms that contribute to explain why this is the case, and highlight the trade-offs between the political feasibility of an agreement and the feasibility of its implementation.

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