The Politics of Minimum Income Protection in the Canadian Provinces

Abstract

AbstractThis article compares social assistance incomes, or minimum income protection, for four household types in the 10 Canadian provinces between 1990 and 2017 and relates these incomes to a number of factors, including partisan dominance over time, trade union density, the presence or absence of poverty reduction strategies, provincial social expenditures, overall redistribution efforts, debt service costs and social assistance recipiency rates. In line with findings for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) welfare states, partisan politics does not play a strong role but, as power resources theory predicts, union density and a province's overall redistribution efforts do. Social assistance recipiency rates, which capture the salience of social assistance incomes in a province, also have a significant, positive impact on welfare incomes, confirming the “welfare paradox” identified by Ivar Lødemel. Poverty reduction strategies, however, do not, and they even have a negative influence on welfare incomes.