The politics of market reforms: Korea's path from Chaebol Republic to market democracy and back

Abstract

This paper studies the politics of market-oriented reforms in Korea since the 1997/98 financial crisis. It focuses on the capacity of the state to implement these reforms, and challenges the view that successfully implemented market reforms follow a technocratic ‘best practice’ approach. On the contrary, this paper argues that reforms in Korea were relatively successful because they were political projects that went beyond ownership concepts of the IMF and World Bank. The temporary weakness of big business (chaebol) and the formation of reform coalitions by the government created a balance of power between societal interest groups that opened a political space for the government. The state regained some of the autonomy it had lost during the ‘Chaebol Republic’ from 1987 to 1997 and was able to implement reforms in a temporary corporatist framework. However, the chaebol adapted to the new situation and used the market-friendly reforms in their favour. The re-emergence of the chaebol undermined state autonomy and with the inauguration of the new President and former chaebol CEO Lee Myung Bak in 2008, Korea is arguably entering the second Chaebol Republic.