The politics of legitimation in combined sanction regimes: the case of Venezuela

Abstract

Abstract Regional international organizations (RIOs) and states are increasingly sanctioning governments, firms and individuals they consider to have violated international norms. How do different RIOs legitimize the decision to impose (or not impose) sanctions? And how do they react to the legitimation strategies of other RIOs and states? This article addresses these questions by analysing the legitimation strategies of the United States and four RIOs involved in the combined sanction regimes against Venezuela between 2014 and 2019: the Organization of American States, the Union of South American Nations, the Common Market of the South and the European Union. Refining the environment-based perspective on legitimation, the article proposes that combined sanction regimes work as environments that shape the legitimation strategies of senders not only by providing templates to emulate but also by triggering processes of differentiation. The article shows how Latin American RIOs adapted their legitimation strategies dynamically in reaction to changes in the strategies of Washington and Brussels. This process, however, was not unidirectional. When Latin American RIOs managed to articulate coherent strategies, they forced Washington and Brussels to recalibrate their own positions and engage in discursive legitimation processes as well.