Abstract

Building on the growing body of research on political institutions, this article explores the causes of electoral reform, with specific reference to Latin America. What factors account for the extensive array of electoral reforms adopted in the region since the return to democracy? How are shifting patterns of political representation related to institutional change? In addressing these questions, I develop an account of electoral reform that places shifting partisan political fortunes at the center of analysis and show that changes in the rules of the electoral game tend to reflect the political self-interest of dominant political parties as defined in relation to mounting electoral uncertainty. The evidence regarding the impact of electoral reforms on party system change is less consistent with the expectations derived from the comparative institutional literature. Over the past two decades, party system change in Latin America has generated institutional change more predictably than vice versa.

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