Abstract
Pluralism has made its way into European law literature already a long time ago. Some of its main tenets have proved to be apt for describing several forms of supranational constitutionalism (EU, ECHR, WTO). In the first two sections, this article reconstructs the two main pluralist interpretations of supranational constitutionalism: on the one side, McCormick’s neo-institutional take on the nature of the EU and, on the other side, Mattias Kumm’s constitutional pluralism. The third section illustrates why while they both present sounding descriptive elements, they should be both rejected because they are not normatively appealing. The fourth section elaborates the idea that a certain understanding of pluralism makes supranational constitutionalism politically shallow. Overall, instead of opening up new possibilities for constitutional transformation, pluralism serves the function of entrenching certain interests.
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