Abstract
In this article the rise of Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party {DPP) from opposition to power (1986-2001) is analyzed from the perspective of party faction development. Faction politics within the DPP can both explain the short period of radicalization in the late 1980s as well as the party's mainly tactical moderation throughout the 1990s. Upon assumption of the presidency in March 2000 the DPP became ruling party. Without a majority in the parliament, President Chen Shuibian (DPP) however failed to implement most of the party's reform policies. Chen had been too dependent on the party's hardliners while the combined opposition alliance {KMT, NP, PFP) played the role of a disloyal opposition. By discussing the prospect of inter-party coalitions after the December 2001 Legislative Yuan (LY) election this analysis comes to the conclusion that the DPP stands at the crossroads: any path - whether with or without a formal coalition - is likely to satisfy few and disappoint many.
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