The politics of Europe 2001: adversity and persistence

Abstract

In its annual report to the European Parliament ‘on the progress achieved by the European Union in 2001,’ the European Council (2002a: 2) was not unjustified in asserting that ‘the year 2001 was a year in which the Union again demonstrated its ability to rise to new challenges while consolidating and building on past achievements’. Nevertheless, too much emphasis on the persistence of European integration in the face of adversity is misleading. What it implies is a sense of momentum: The EU can survive by muddling through if nothing else. Hence Europe’s leaders can refer to the historic commitment to enlargement as though ‘history’ and ‘commitment’ are themselves sufficient to ensure enlargement will come about. What the persistence of European integration leaves open is the stability of the mechanism behind it: could the act of muddling through undermine Europe’s ability to resist the influence of external factors? This question lies at the heart of the European Council declaration made at Laeken in December 2001. The concern is not that the process of European integration is somehow out of touch with the people and therefore unable to function. Rather it is that continuing to function while remaining out of touch with the people is likely to undermine the future viability of the European project. Such concern cannot be justified solely with reference to the record of events. In order to assess whether the concern expressed at Laeken is warranted, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms that allow European integration to resist the influence of external shocks. This argument about the politics of Europe in 2001 is made in four sections. The first outlines the shocks witnessed during the course of the year: the Irish veto of the Nice Treaty and the riots surrounding the Gothenburg summit; September 11; and the collapse of business confidence in Europe and elsewhere. The second examines the resilience of European projects in the face of those shocks: enlargement; security; and economic and monetary union. The third suggests three plausible explanations for this resilience: multilevel governance; path dependence; and distributive equilibrium. The fourth section questions whether persistence can guarantee stability in the future.