The Politics of Decentralization in a Centralized Party System: The Case of Democratic Spain

Abstract

William H. Riker argued that most distinctive aspect of federalism is the consti tutionally assured potential for local governments to disrupt.1 Taken too far, inter governmental conflicts could make policymaking unresponsive and inefficient. Riker argued that such disharmony, when not effectively eliminated by (^cen tralization of administrative structure of state, can be mediated by central ization of political party system. His argument focused on two dimensions of party system: distribution of partisan loyalties between central and subnational government and tendency of locally elected politicians to articulate local inter ests. According to Riker, first dimension of disharmony is more likely to be con trolled where same party or alliance controls national government and most or all of subnational units. This argument assumes that national parties are disciplined around partisan brokers who reside at national level. These conditions are also crucial in reducing tendency of subnational politicians to articulate local interests to detriment of their affiliations. Therefore, centralized, disciplined parties with high degrees of concordance in partisan loyalties across national-subnational divide are able to limit intergovernmental conflict. Riker's theory directly influenced more recent comparative studies of decentral ization that follow his notion that party system structures are key independent variables in explaining nature of intergovernmental relations. Most recently, seminal work by Eliza Willis, Christopher Garman, and Stephan Haggard focuses on location of party brokers, party leaders who shape careers of politicians on national and subnational levels through control over nominations and placement on electoral lists.2 In party systems in which these leaders are located in subnational government, state is more likely to be decentralized in its policy responsibilities, revenue-raising powers, and expenditures since these resources will flow to cen ters of power that shape political interests of national policymakers.3 There is an ongoing tension between national and subnational politicians in which national par tisans, especially those in government, prefer to limit autonomy of subnational governments in order to maximize their own capacity to distribute resources across a country based on criteria of need and expected political payoffs.4 Closed elec toral lists empower party leaders who control not only nomination of candidates but