THE POLITICS OF CYBER

Abstract

ABSTRACTWe live in a world of competing nation states, proxies of those states and non-nation state actors. This competition manifests itself in any number of ways – conflict, sanctions, restrictions, embargo, assassinations, etc. Clausewitz’s suggested “War as politics by other means” so, the natural conclusion is cyber espionage, cyber-attacks and cyber influence operations, are merely manifestations of a policy clash between two or more competing powers or proxies. This article suggests the development of nation state Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) capability is a direct result of the collision of competing national interests and the national policy which drives those interests. Surprising no one the work required to counter these cyber threats is technically difficult and legally problematic. Charting a course from the early days of website defacement to Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDOS) the evolution of capability of APT actors has been significant and rapid. Contrasting this rapid advancement of Chinese, Iranian, Russian and North Korean APT actors is the lack of an effective dissuasive policy and a decidedly placid global political and legal response. With the notable American judicial system and policy apparatus it seems evident the USA remains a global cyber police force using a potent and extraordinary Extraterritorial jurisdiction (EJT) authority far outside of American borders to target both criminal and nation state actors.