The Politics of “Cultural Diplomacy”

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ONE of the tasks of statecraft in any conflict is to infer the adversary's objectives from his observable tactics and strategies, deciding in the process how much energy to expend in divining such objectives and how much in shaping them in keeping with one's own capabilities and goals. Frederick C. Barghoorn identifies the immediate objectives of the of East and West, and specifically of the Soviet Union and the United States, as being of two kinds: to gain knowledge of the adversary, and to influence the adversary's perception of oneselfin other words, to gather information, and to substitute favorable images for unfavorable stereotypes. The West is mainly curious about the inner working of the Soviet socio-political system; the East about the capitalist system's output of material goods. Gaining information about the adversary is always useful when it increases one's capability to deal with him; but image-creating or stereotype-destroying is meaningful only in relation to the ultimate objectives-or unintended long-term effect-of cultural exchanges. Without attempting to explore and relate these different aspects systematically, Barghoorn has no illusions about the intent of Soviet cultural diplomacy. It aims to distract and morally disarm the United States and subvert the less-developed countries away from their connections with the West. He feels that the curse of political exploitation may vanish from Soviet cultural diplomacy (and, presumably, from its American counterpart, insofar as it has a similar tendency) only if less power-oriented elites rise to authority, perhaps partly as a consequence of cultural exchanges. If less guardedly than Barghoorn, like-minded Western analysts of diplomacy through economic aid have voiced similar strictures and hopes in regard to that other form of humane activity with variable political content.