The Politics of Afghan Resettlement and Rehabilitation

Abstract

Until the Geneva accords of April 14, 1988, that formalized the Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, the future of the country seemed largely predictable, even if the duration of the conflict remained uncertain. The Soviet Union was deemed unlikely to loosen its grip on Afghanistan; history and the logic of its 1979 armed intervention explained why Moscow would wait out the forces of the Afghan resistance. The Soviets had laid the foundation for political and economic integration with Afghanistan. Afghanistan had become dependent on its northern neighbor for critical commodities, transit routes, export markets, and technical expertise. Whether the outcome would be a strongly dependent but still sovereign state within the Soviet orbit or virtual absorption as a new Soviet republic was yet to be determined. But the penetration by Soviet civilian administrators and the assistance of the Soviet military appeared irreversible. With the installation of a Kabul regime owing fealty to Moscow, the communist ideology had been safely ensconced. There remained only to pacify and co-opt dissident elements. In the end, through education and example, Afghanistan would be Sovietized. Now the future is less clear. For reasons having to do with Soviet global policy objectives and new domestic priorities, Moscow decided to disengage from Afghanistan, at least militarily. Few observers now expect the Kabul government to survive very long. Most of the five million Afghan refugees abroad, roughly one-third of Afghanistan's prewar population, are expected to return to their home areas, as are upward of two million displaced people inside Afghanistan. The international community has plans to facilitate the resettlement and assume a major role in aiding the country's reconstruction. But beyond these anticipated outcomes lie a