Abstract

This article examines Belarusian strategies in the bilateral politico-military alliance with Russia, focusing on the issue of recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in addition to the evolution of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. It argues that the approaches interpreting the alliance as a response to decisions of external actors cannot fully account for the disagreements between the parties. The analysis of Belarusian strategies demonstrates how the decisions of external actors, such as the European Union and to a certain extent the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, function as bargaining chips for the Belarusian leadership. Due to the intra-alliance security dilemma, external actors have at times even weakened the alliance rather than automatically inducing its cohesion.

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