Abstract
Using a data set of two important emerging markets namely Taiwan and Pakistan, we investigate an unexplored dynamic of the top leadership i.e. the politician as a CEO and determine their impact on firm value. We show that the presence of the powerful politician as a CEO tends to limit the board power and endorse managerial entrenchment i.e. put their self-interests ahead of the firm's goals, which in turn, damage the firms’ value. We find a significant negative moderating effect of the political CEOs on the relationship of concentrated ownership, board independence and firm value.
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