The Political Role of the European Court of Justice: How the EU Institutional Thresholds Shield the Integrationist Power of the Court

Roberto Reyes Izquierdo

doi:10.33426/rcg/2019/107/1427

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyse how the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been a fundamental factor in the integration process of the European Union, in spite of the obstacles posed by the intergovernmental dynamics that have traditionally hindered the construction of a stronger, cohesive and more integrated Europe. Important principles such as direct effect or supremacy of EU law have been developed through ECJ rulings and case law, even when such principles were not literally foreseen in the foundational Treaties. Therefore, this paper argues that the role and power of the Court as an “indirect law-maker” have been essential for the construction of the European Union, and this has been possible due to the complexities and weaknesses of the legislative process involving the three main decision-makers: the Commission, the Council of the EU, and the European Parliament.

Highlights

The role played by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is often disregarded in studies on European integration
This interaction and influence of the Court on the legislative process has been a consistent subject for debate between those who defend that the activity of the Court highly constrains the room for manoeuvre of the other institutions; and those who, on the contrary, consider the ECJ to be extremely dependent on the preferences of the EU political actors and Member States
This debate confronts two different views on the power of courts to foster political change: the “dynamic” and the “constrained” court views (Martinsen, 2015: 3). This debate is relevant to the question under scrutiny because of the conflicting theoretical approaches of both views regarding the strength of the Court of Justice in its interaction with the political decision-makers of the EU, involved in the legislative process: the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament

Summary

INTRODUCTION

The role played by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is often disregarded in studies on European integration. This interaction and influence of the Court on the legislative process has been a consistent subject for debate between those who defend that the activity of the Court highly constrains the room for manoeuvre of the other institutions; and those who, on the contrary, consider the ECJ to be extremely dependent on the preferences of the EU political actors and Member States This debate confronts two different views on the power of courts to foster political change: the “dynamic” and the “constrained” court views (Martinsen, 2015: 3). This paper aims to prove how the dynamic court view has a stronger standpoint on the role of the ECJ in the European Union and make a brief assessment of such role

THE ECJ AS A LAW MAKER

INSTITUTIONAL THRESHOLDS

10 See Martinsen 2015

CONCLUSION