The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia

Abstract

THE MAJOR PROBLEM which Indonesia's military leadership has had to face during the past decade has been to develop a role for the army in the national political structure that would satisfy its political, economic and social aspirations. It was never a passive professional army and its revolutionary origins and continual operations since I948 against domestic political rebellions 1 have made its officer corps fully aware of national politics. Moreover, as a non-traditional institution 2 the army has provided an alternative ladder to success-until I957-I958 a short one-for men whose origins did not give them a place among the new republic's political-social elite. From I957 on the opportunity existed for these officers to become openly involved in politics. For a variety of reasons, some of which will be discussed here, they avoided seizing power and were forced instead to compete for it. Indeed, only gradually did an awareness that they were competing for power dawn upon most politically inclined officers. So far the result has been an evolution of the army's political role that is unlike that in any other country of Southeast Asia, an evolution in which the intelligent guidance of General Nasution (Chief-of-Staff of the Army from I955 to i962) has played an important part. This article examines a few aspects of that evolution and attempts to interpret some of the problems which it has produced. Until I956 the army was on the political defensive.' It did retaliate against parliamentary interference, as in October I952 when Nasution and several officers tried to force President Soekarno to assume strong presidential pow-