The political psychology of Israeli prime ministers: when hard-liners opt for peace. By Yael S. Aronoff

Abstract

In this work, Yael S. Aronoff studies six Israeli prime ministers: Yitzhak Shamir, Binyamin Netanyahu, Ariel Sharon, Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak and Shimon Peres, and explains why some departed from doctrinaire political and ideological positions on matters such as the Arab—Israeli peace process and regional political settlement, while others did not. The author traces the leaders’ psychological and political conduct using an ideological index, revealing whether the individuals felt time to be on Israel's side; their ideological goals; whether they saw the world as being for or against Israel; how much peace might contribute to security; and whether peace required territorial compromise. In addition, Aronoff conducts a cognitive style analysis of the leaders relating to, inter alia, their risk propensity, cognitive flexibility, emotional intelligence and image of the enemy. Commencing with Shamir, Aronoff describes a leader averse to compromise on issues he considered vital to Israel's national interests. Nowhere was this better highlighted than in the standoff between the Israeli Prime Minister and the White House of George H. W. Bush, when, in 1992, Jerusalem had to choose between continued construction in the Occupied Territories or American loan guarantees. Shamir chose the former, and, along with Bush, was voted out of power. However, Shamir did attend the 1991 peace conference in Madrid, thereby revealing a tactical, rather than strategic shift. The emerging theme of change continues in the chapter dealing with Netanyahu, who, although sceptical of the Oslo Accords, nevertheless ratified them and went on to sign the Wye Agreement. Aronoff also highlights the importance of the relationship between Netanyahu and Obama, which, in the buildup to, and aftermath of, the recent Israeli elections has taken on a new energy. No observer could have failed to notice the discord between the two leaders surrounding Netanyahu's 2015 speech to Congress, further compounded by US condemnation of the rhetoric employed domestically by Netanyahu on the eve of his recent election victory. Aronoff does justice to Ariel Sharon in the chapter dedicated to the latter-day peacemaker. Special attention is paid to his unlikely rise to power in 2001, his exit from the Likud, his creation of the centrist political party Kadima and Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. Sharon explained his political transformation in a succinct sentence after becoming prime minister. Talking of the Prime Minister's Office, he stated: ‘What I see from here, I didn't see from there’.