The political economy of tariff policy: A case study of the United States

Abstract

Economic historians generally agree that the Civil War marks a watershed in the history of 19th century American tariff policy. With few exceptions, antebellum tariff legislation had reduced duties on imports. During the three decades prior to the war, tariff rates systematically declined. Import duties were to reach their lowest level of the century with the passage of the 1857 tariff act. With the outbreak of the Civil War, however, legislation was passed which dramatically increased tariff rates. While originally intended for the purpose of raising revenue, the “war tariffs” remained in effect throughout the rest of the century. Given such a fundamental change in American tariff policy it is not surmising that economic historians have written extensively on the subject. Many scholars have focused attention on the political history of the legislative shift.’ Others have directed their inquiries to specific industry studies.2 Recently, attention has turned to an examination of the relationship between tariff policy and social welfare.3 Curiously enough, however, recent research has not generally considered the determinants of tariff policy.4 In the case of the postbellum period no systematic reassessment of tariff formation has been made since the work dane by Taussig (1931). The conventional wisdom on postbellum policy still reflects Taussig’s perception of the political and industrial vested interests working to maintain a protectionist policy. Taussig complained at length about “the process by which the protective system has gradually been brought to