Abstract

At borders between poor and rich countries, huge service price differentials could be exploited to mutual benefit, offering better-paid job opportunities to the poor as well as better shopping opportunities to the rich. However, cross-border shopping is often limited by the substantial transaction costs of crossing the border. Moreover, countries and regions frequently fail to cut these transaction costs even when they have the opportunity to do so. We provide a politico-economic analysis of cross-border integration projects. More specifically, we show how the political outcome depends on (i) intra-country mobility, (ii) decision making and housing ownership regimes, and (iii) federal grants and international border regulations. Our analysis builds on two key characteristics in which individuals differ: interregional mobility and intercultural ability.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.