The political economy of drought in Southern Africa 1991–1993

Abstract

Drought by itself does not lead to famine. That requires severe economic weakness, very poor national and/or external response and/or war. In practice, mass starvation does not happen in Africa in the absence of war. However, the degree of hunger and, perhaps even more, the speed of affected household livelihood recovery depend heavily on domestic and international strategic responses. The present standard donor political economy of response to crisis is one-off, short term, not incorporating livelihood rehabilitation or future vulnerability reduction. Further, it is usually managed in a way fragmenting national response and frequently decapacitating national structures. This ‘Good Samaritan’ approach provides no link back to ‘normal development’ which also tends to exclude post drought reconstruction by livelihood rehabilitation. National responses vary in coherence, degree of sophistication, capacity and relationship to sustaining or rehabilitating livelihoods. In part this reflects governing coalition political priorities - in the absence of war even a very poor state can mount programmes averting mass migration and famine (e.g. Tanzania). Both normative and efficiency criteria suggest more coherent/nationally owned responses within ongoing donor and national emergency response structures; greater expedition in action to avert people being forced to leave their homes, and building livelihood rehabilitation and future vulnerability reduction components into drought responses as integral components.