The political dynamics of informal networks in South Korea: the case of parachute appointment

Abstract

Dense informal networks between public- and private-sector elites have long been identified as a key institutional feature that had underpinned rapid economic development in many East Asian countries. With the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, however, a number of scholars have cast doubt on the long-term efficacy of informal networks, discrediting the East Asian model as crony capitalism. Although these debates renewed our interests in the role of informal networks in East Asia, they fall short of highlighting the real dynamics underlying informal networks. Parachute appointment in Korea – political appointment of ex-politicians and ex-bureaucrats into public and private corporations – is a prime example demonstrating political intervention in the formation and management of informal networks.We argue that the nature of political competition in Korea is a key to understanding the underlying dynamics of informal networks. First, Korean politicians, the president and the ruling party have actively engaged in making and maintaining the networks of parachute appointment. Second, owing to its politicized nature, parachute appointment is neither institutionalized nor stably managed. In the current highly uncertain political and economic situation, both public and private corporations have actively embraced parachute appointment as a means of fortifying external networking with the incoming political leadership.